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NOTE

WEATHERING THE SECOND STORM:
HOW BUREAUCRACY AND FRAUD CURTAILED
HOMEOWNERS' EFFORTS TO REBUILD AFTER
SUPERSTORM SANDY
I. INTRODUCTION

Superstorm Sandy1 ("Sandy") destroyed the homes and lives of
countless New York residents on October 29, 2012.2 According to the
National Hurricane Center, Sandy was not a hurricane when it made
landfall near Brigantine, New Jersey; 3 it was instead a post-tropical
cyclone4 with seventy-knot maximum sustained winds.5 Despite Sandy
losing its hurricane status,6 the enormous size of the storm caused a
catastrophic storm surge which inundated the New York and New Jersey
coastline.7 The destruction received a preliminary cost estimate of
approximately fifty billion dollars, which made "Sandy the second
costliest cyclone to hit the United States since 1900. "8
Sandy came with strong winds, but the majority of the physical
damage to homes, businesses, and infrastructure was the result of severe
1. Merriam-Webster dictionary defines a superstorm as "a very large and powerful storm."
Superstorm, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
superstorm (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
2.

See ERIC S. BLAKE ET AL., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE SANDY 1 (2013),

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012_Sandy.pdf (providing a full synoptic history of the
development of Sandy, including when the storm first made landfall).
3. Id. There are significant consequences when a storm is downgraded from hurricane status
because insurance carriers cannot impose hurricane deductibles. Governors Say No to Hurricane
Deductibles, CNN MONEY (Nov. 1, 2012, 12:48 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/1 1/01/real estate/
sandy-hurricane-deductible/index.html. This can save insureds thousands of dollars. Id.
4. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration defines a post-tropical cyclone as
"a former tropical cyclone ....
that no longer possesses sufficient tropical characteristics to be
considered a tropical cyclone." Glossary of NHC Terms, NAT'L HURRICANE CTR.,
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutgloss.shtml (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
5.

BLAKE ET AL., supra note 2, at 1.

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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flooding. 9 The flooding in New York City alone spanned fifty-one miles,
covering seventeen percent of the land mass.1 ° Over 443,000 New
Yorkers lived in the areas that flooded, which included 88,700 buildings
containing over 300,000 homes and approximately 23,400 businesses.11
Many coastal areas were inundated with flood water reaching heights of
eleven to fourteen feet above ground level in some areas. 12 Five of New
York's coastal areas that faced the brunt of the storm surge included the
Brooklyn-Queens waterfront, the east and south shores of Staten Island,
13
south Queens, southern Brooklyn, and southern Manhattan. These five
14
coastal areas are home to 685,000 New Yorkers.
The buildings in the areas along the coastlines which received the
most extensive flooding were severely damaged, in many cases
uninhabitable, and deemed structurally unsound.15 The extent of the
damage to many coastal homes was so severe that some were moved off
their foundations and in other cases walls collapsed.1 6 Another major
source of complete devastation was caused by electrical fires which
destroyed over 100 homes and businesses.17
As of December 2012, DOB [Department of Buildings] had tagged
nearly 800 buildings as having been structurally damaged or destroyed
across the five boroughs, with tens of thousands more impacted,
including buildings containing nearly 70,000 housing units that were
registered with FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] and
determined to have sustained some level of damage. 18
The government's response to Sandy began almost immediately,
starting on November 2, 2012, with FEMA opening the first Disaster
Recovery Center in Coney Island and announcing that survivors could
register for the Individuals and Households Program

(H"

19

On

9. CITY OF N.Y., A STRONGER, MORE REsILIENT NEW YORK 11 (June 11, 2013),
https://wwwl .nyc.gov/site/sirr/report/report.page.
10. Id. at 13.
11. Id. It is worth noting that a significant amount of the city's infrastructure was affected by
the flooding, "including hospitals and nursing homes, key power facilities, many elements of the
city's transportation networks, and all of the city's wastewater treatment plants." Id.
12. Id. "Water heights of several feet above ground level were prevalent in many coastal
areas. Near Sea Gate, on the Coney Island peninsula in Brooklyn, the water reached 11 feet above
ground level, and at Tottenville on Staten Island, they rose to 14 feet." Id.
13. Id. at 18.
14. Id.
15. Id. Hundreds of homes across the five boroughs were declared structurally unsound by the
Department of Buildings by December of 2012. Id. at 14, 18.
16. Id. at 14.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. New York Three Years After Sandy, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/new-york-three-years-
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January 11, 2013, over $1.1 billion was paid to national flood insurance
policyholders in New York.2 ° On February 16, 2013, the Small Business
Administration ("SBA") approved more than $1 billion in loans, $966
million of which were loans to repair and rebuild homes, and over $7
million in economic injury loans.2 1 By September 23, 2013, "[g]rants
22
under the Individual Assistance program surpass[ed] $1 billion.,
FEMA referred 211,970 households to the IHP, disbursed over $1
billion to the IHP, and disbursed over $1 billion to help individuals and
families recover.23 5263 applicants received maximum grants of $31,900
each. 24 Also, "[t]he SBA approved $1.57 billion in disaster loans for
23,221 individuals and businesses. Of that, nearly $1.3 billion was
approved for homeowners and renters, and about $267.6 million was
approved for businesses. 25 The most recent FEMA Recovery
Milestones Report was last updated in 2016 and reported recovery
figures for 2015.26 Notably, on May 26, 2015, FEMA approved an
additional $211 million for the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
("HMGP"), which increased the total amount of available funding to
$1.38 billion. 27 As of May 26, 2015, New York residents filed 57,289
Sandy-related insurance claims and received approximately $4 billion in
flood insurance payments for repairs and content losses.28
Despite the seemingly enormous amounts of grant money that New
Yorkers received through FEMA and its various programs,29 many New
Yorkers are still unable to properly rebuild their homes and lives.3" For
many residents of New York, the road to rebuilding took years, leaving
many families homeless or living in sub-standard conditions due to

after-sandy (last visited Apr. 22, 2019). For a summary of the Individuals and Households Program,
see Assistance to Individuals and Households-Individualsand Households Program (IHP) Fact
Sheet, FEMA, www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/24945 (last visited Apr. 22, 2019);
20. New York Three Years After Sandy, supra note 19.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. For a summary of the HMGP, see Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, FEMA,
www.fema.gov/hazard-mitigation-grant-program (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
29. See New York Three Years After Sandy, supra note 19 (reporting the various types of aid
and amounts of aid awarded to Sandy survivors from 2012-2015).
30. See Melissa H. Luckman et al., Three Years Later, Sandy Survivors Remain Homeless, 32
TOURO L. REV. 313, 314-15 (2016) (explaining the hurdles Sandy survivors of New York and New
Jersey faced due to inequities in the way aid is distributed under the Stafford Act and fraud
committed under FEMA and by flood insurance companies).
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delays with various government programs or insurance fraud.3' Over six
years later, many homes across New York are still in disrepair due to the
protect their citizens
federal and state governments' failure to properly
32
from insurance fraud and provide adequate relief.
Under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act ("Stafford Act"),33 the federal regulations that govern the
distribution of aid to Superstorm Sandy victims were meant to prevent
alleged victims from "double dipping" by collecting money from more
than one source for the same loss. 34 However, these regulations were
applied unevenly and in an overbroad fashion.3 5 This overbroad
application caused honest homeowners who paid for limited insurance
coverage for natural disasters to be completely excluded from receiving
funds from FEMA for damages unrelated to their insurance coverage.36
Perhaps the most pervasive issue many homeowners faced was
caused by insurance companies that committed fraud by doctoring
engineering reports to prevent policyholders from collecting the full
value of their policy. 37 Homeowners who were distraught and displaced
from their homes were not aware of the fraudulent practices by the
insurance companies and their only option was to sue their insurance
38
carrier for fraud in an attempt to collect their insurance policies.
This Note begins by examining the government's response to
Hurricane Katrina, the implications of failure to rebuild in Louisiana,
and how it changed some of the policies that affected what relief Sandy
survivors would receive.39 Part II discusses the Stafford Act and the
federal regulations that govern disaster relief, and also provides an

31. Id.; see Reuven Blau, Hundreds of Homeowners Hit by Sandy Battling With NYC's Build
It Back Program to Finish Restoring Their Homes, NY DAILY NEWS (Oct. 27, 2017),
https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/homeowners-hit-sandy-battle-build-back-repair-delaysarticle-1.3591917 (explaining the issues plaguing homeowners trying to rebuild their home through
the Build It Back Program); see also FEMA: Evidence of Fraudin HurricaneSandy Reports, CBS
NEWS (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fema-evidence-of-fraud-in-hurricane-sandyreports (describing the evidence of insurance fraud and the effects of Sandy survivors efforts to
rebuild).
32. See Luckman et al., supra note 30 passim; Blau, supra note 31; FEMA: Evidence of
Fraudin HurricaneSandy Reports, supranote 31.
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5208 (2012).
34. Id. § 5155 (Section 5155 of the Stafford Act explains the general prohibition against
duplication of benefits); see also Luckman et al., supra note 30, at 317-19.
35. Luckman et al., supra note 30, at 319-21.
36. Id.
37. Jay M. Levin, PotentialInsuranceCompany Fraudin Superstorm Sandy Litigation, INT'L
RISK MGMT. INST. (Dec. 2014), https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-commentary/potentialinsurance-company- fraud-in-superstorm-sandy-litigation.
38. Id.
39. See infta Part H.
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overview of some of the main disaster relief programs available to
Sandy survivors, including FEMA grants, the Build It Back program,
and SBA loans.40 Further, Part II provides an overview of the National
Flood Insurance Program ("NFIP") and flood insurance policies.4 1 Part
III addresses the legal issues many homeowners have faced and continue
to face while trying to rebuild.42 These legal issues include the
misapplication of the Stafford Act, rampant insurance fraud, FEMA's
inability to adequately address or prevent fraud, and recent legislation
and its potential effects on future natural disaster relief.43 Part IV argues
that amending the Stafford Act is necessary to provide adequate relief in
the future, and amending the National Flood Insurance Act is necessary
to properly protect homeowners from fraud.' Part IV also suggests
creating a new claims review process to increase transparency and
fairness to policyholders who were victims of fraud.4 5
ii. THE HISTORY OF NATURAL DISASTER RELIEF:
FROM KATRINA TO SANDY

When Hurricane Katrina devastated the coastline of Louisiana on
August 29, 2005, the federal government was faced with the enormous
task of rebuilding after what would be the costliest hurricane to hit the
Gulf Coast.46 The legislation passed in the wake of Hurricane Katrina,
combined with the failure of efforts to rebuild, shaped the laws that
controlled the relief efforts for future natural disasters, including
Superstorm Sandy.47 Subpart A looks critically at the federal
government's response to Hurricane Katrina, particularly the many
failures of the Road Home Program, as well as the federal government's
reorganization of FEMA through the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act of 200648 and its impact on future disaster
relief.4 9 Subpart B explains the Stafford Act and other federal regulations

40. See infra Part H.
41. See infra Partll.
42. See infra Part 1H.
43. See infra Part I.
44. See infra Part IV.
45. See infra Part IV.
46. HurricaneKatrina Statistics Fast Facts, CNN LiBRARY, http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/
23/us/hurricane-katrina-statistics-fast-facts/index.html (last updated Aug. 30, 2018).
47. Polly Mosendz, After Hurricane Katrina, A Man-Made Disaster in New Orleans,
NEWSWEEK (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/2015/08/28/hurricane-katrina-neworleans-rebuilding-3 64051 .html.
48. Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120
Stat. 1394.
49. See infra Part l.A
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that governed federal relief efforts for Superstorm Sandy survivors."
Moreover, Subpart B discusses recent attempts to amend the Stafford
Act.51 Subpart C explains the federal relief programs available to
Superstorm Sandy survivors (specifically the Build It Back program and
SBA loans), describes how they work, and analyzes the drawbacks of
these programs. 52 Lastly, Subpart D provides an overview of FEMA, the
NFIP, and the process for filing flood insurance claims.5 3
A. The Legacy of HurricaneKatrina
It is necessary to look back at how the federal government
responded to Hurricane Katrina to understand the impact on future relief
efforts launched by the federal government. 4 Subpart 1 provides
information about the costs associated with the storm, the efforts to
rebuild, and the lasting impacts of the damage.55 Subpart 1 then focuses
on the Road Home Program, which was one of the primary FEMA
6
programs that provided funding for homeowners seeking to rebuild.
Subpart 2 discusses the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform
Act of 2006, which was meant to remedy the issues FEMA faced in the
FEMA failed
wake of Hurricane Katrina. 7 Subpart 2 then addresses5 how
8
Sandy.
Superstorm
following
issues
similar
to prevent
1. The Federal Government's Response to Hurricane Katrina
The residents of New Orleans grimly describe the government's
response to Hurricane Katrina as a man-made disaster.5 9 The disaster
came in three parts: first, a category three hurricane; second, the failure
of the levees; and third, the government's involvement. 60 The damages
totaled approximately $125 billion, making it the costliest hurricane in
U.S. history. 61 The federal government needed to respond to the disaster,
but the legislature failed to provide an effective system for rebuilding
and distributing federal aid. 62 The federal government provided billions
I.B.
.B.
I.C.
II.D.
supra note 47.
H.A.1.
II.A.1.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part
See Mosendz,
See infra Part
See infra Part

57.

See infra Part II.A.2.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See infra Part II.A.2.
Mosendz, supra note 47.
Id.
HurricaneKatrina StatisticsFastFacts, supra note 46.
Mosendz, supra note 47.
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of dollars towards public works projects, rebuilding the city's
infrastructure, and rebuilding the levee, all of which were successful and
significantly improved the infrastructure that was in disrepair even
before the storm.63 However, the main program designed to help
homeowners rebuild, the Road Home Program, was riddled with
complications and failures. 64
It is true that the government faced an unprecedented task in
rebuilding New Orleans, 65 but there are no excuses for the bureaucratic
mess that became the Road Home Program.6 6 Many homeowners did not
have insurance, so the Road Home Program was their only saving
grace. 67 However, success stories were rare, and the program has been
criticized for its numerous failures. 68 The program was designed to assist
homeowners who did not have the financial means to rebuild.6 9 This
would be accomplished by having the "government [] pay the difference
between a home's pre-storm net worth and the insurance payout the
homeowner received, up to $150,000. '7° The consequences of basing the
amount of aid money homeowners received on the pre-storm net worth
was that lower-income neighborhoods received significantly less aid
money. 71 This caused the program to be discriminatory against AfricanAmericans who received significantly less Road Home grant money
compared to their-white counterparts whose homes had a higher prestorm net worth. 72 In response to the discriminatory policies of the Road
Home Program, the Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Center filed suit
for a potential class of over 20,000 homeowners for discrimination.7 3
The case settled, awarding eligible homeowners $437 million.74
63.

Jeff Adelson, After Hurricane Katrina: How Federal Aid Helped the Region Rebuild,

Improve, GREATER NEW ORLEANS INC. (June 20, 2015), http://gnoinc.org/news/region-news/after-

hurricane-katrina-how-federal-aid-heped-the-region-rebuild-imprve-advocate-staff-photo-byjohn-mccusker-the-new-permanent-londn-avenue-anal-pumping-statin-is-under-cnstructinwhere.
64. Id.
65. Elizabeth Chuck, Bill Includes Unprecedented Flood Aid, NBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2005),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/10533051/ns/us news-katrina the long road back/t/bill-includesunprecedented-flood-aid/#.WeQWK3eGOl s.
66. Adelson, supra note 63.
67. See Mosendz, supra note 47; see also David Hammer, Examining Post-KatrinaRoad
Home Program: 'It's More Than the Money. It's the Hoops We Had to Jump Through to Do It',
ADVOCATE
(Aug.
23, 2015, 4:51
AM), http://www.theadvocate.com/baton-rouge/
news/articlef9763ca5-42ba-5a62-9935-c5f7ca94a7c4.htm.
68. See, e.g., Mosendz, supra note 47.
69. Id
70. Id.
71. Hammer, supra note 67; Mosendz, supra note 47.
72. Hammer, supra note 67; Mosendz, supra note 47.
73. Mosendz, supranote 47.
74. Id.
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Discrimination was not the only major failure of the Road Home
Program; complications arose from inefficiency of the bureaucracy that
was slow to provide relief money, which was caused by the ridiculously
complicated application process. 75 Additionally, "[t]he onerous approval
process required a variety of documents flood victims generally didn't
have: deeds, purchase paperwork, mortgage statements and the like.
Katrina had washed them all away. ' 76 Homeowners also faced rampant
oversight of the
fraud 77 because Road Home did not provide any
78
contractors that homeowners hired for their repairs.
Another failure of the Road Home Program was the government's
inability to ensure that homeowners used their grant money to rebuild
their properties. 79 Homeowners signed a covenant to rebuild and
reoccupy their homes within three years from when they accepted grants
through Road Home, but this was not enough because of complications
8
that were out of some homeowners' control. " Due to contractor fraud
and mortgage companies garnishing grant checks, not everyone had the
funds necessary to rebuild.8 '
In the end, Road Home paid 130,000 homeowners a total of
$9 billion.82 While the program helped thousands of homeowners
rebuild, at the ten-year mark in August 2015, many people were still
struggling to rebuild.8 3
2. The Reorganization of FEMA and its Impact
on Future Disaster Relief
In response to the lessons learned from various unforeseen and
unanticipated failures of efforts to rebuild after Hurricane Katrina, the
federal government responded by enacting the Post-Katrina Emergency
84
The Act
Management Reform Act of 2006 ("PKEvRA").
75. Adelson, supra note 63; Mosendz, supra note 47.
76. The State of Louisiana paid ICF International, a Virginia company, $900 million to
manage the Road Home Program, but the company wasted millions and set up an application
process with fifty steps. Mosendz, supra note 47. "By January 15, 2007, Road Home had received
almost 99,000 applications. It gave out only 177 payments." Id.
77. Id. In some neighborhoods, an estimated eighty percent of the residents fell victim to
contractor fraud. Id.
78. Adelson, supra note 63; Mosendz, supra note 47.
79. See Hammer, supra note 67; Mosendz, supra note 47.
80. Hammer, supra note 67. "State officials say fewer than 7,000 grantees, or about 6 percent,
have failed to meet their obligations." Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83.

Id.

84. Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120
Stat. 1394; Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act, FEMA, https://emilms.fema.gov/is230c/
femOlOl200.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
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"significantly reorganized FEMA, provided it substantial new authority
to remedy gaps in response, and included a more robust preparedness
mission for FEMA. '' 85 While the PKEMRA provides an overhaul of
many different aspects of natural disaster preparedness and response
efforts, the areas that directly affect federal aid grants for rebuilding
were not significantly changed.86
The PKEMRA amended the Stafford Act in areas that affect federal
aid to homeowners, including the provision of aid to individuals and
housing assistance. 87 The changes under aid to individuals specifically
addresses special circumstances or unique needs of individuals with
disabilities; authorizes new types of assistance including transportation,
case management services to state, local, or qualified private
organizations that provide assistance to victims; and requires the FEMA
administrator to help reunite separated families.88 The only amendment
related to housing assistance that would potentially provide for more
federal aid money to homeowners is the elimination of "statutory
ceilings on financial aid to be provided for housing repair and
replacement."8 9 However, this is undermined by the fact that the
amendments did "not eliminate the overall cap of $25,000 that may be
provided under Section 408" of the Stafford Act.9 There are no
substantial changes that were expected after the numerous issues related
to rebuilding during Hurricane Katrina relief efforts.9
The PKEMRA also included a pilot program to improve housing
assistance to disaster victims by increasing the use of rental properties to
provide temporary housing. 92 The pilot program allows the FEMA
administrator to fund repairs and improvements of multi-family rental
properties in disaster areas to increase the number of rental options for

85.

Post-KatrinaEmergency Reform Act, supranote 84.

86. KEITH BEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33729, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
POLICY CHANGES AFTER HuRRICANE KATRINA: A SUMMARY OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS 35-36

(2007). This report outlined the improvements to federal assistance and aid to individuals, stating
that PKEMRA now addresses unique needs and special circumstances for disabled people and those
with limited English proficiency and offers new transportation assistance. Id. While these are
important additions, they do not address the bigger underlying problems that arose in the aftermath
of Katrina relating to fraud and bureaucratic failures as discussed in Part lI.A. 1. Id.;
see supra Part
II.A.1.
87.

CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL33729 at 35-36.

88. Id.
89. Id.at 36.
90. Id.Other amendments under housing assistance include "FEMA's authority to construct
permanent' housing and adds the phrase 'semi-permanent,"' as well as making utility costs and
security deposits eligible housing assistance. Id.
91. See supra Part II.A.1.
92. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33729 at 37.
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displaced disaster victims. 93 While this program is certainly helpful for
providing temporary housing for victims who need to rebuild, it does not
that affected the rebuilding efforts for
resolve more pressing issues
94
Katrina.
homeowners during
Due to the enormous amount of reports of fraud by contractors and
insurance companies alike, it would make sense for the PKEMRA to
provide significant amendments that would help prevent fraud for future
disaster relief efforts. 95 However, while the Act included amendments
for fraud, waste, and abuse controls that mostly seek to protect the
federal government from fraudulent claims, it does not provide specific
relief for disaster victims. 96 The Act provides that the Administrator
should designate funds for oversight activities, and it requires the
agencies that receive federal funds to create oversight plans that describe
how they intend to use funds and to include a risk assessment to identify
97
areas with the greatest risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. The federal
agencies are also required to annually report the use of the funds to the
Administrator and Congress.98 Further, the Administrator must "develop
and maintain internal management controls of FEMA disaster assistance
programs to prevent fraud and waste by collecting information on
disbursements to identify applications from persons ineligible for
assistance."9 9 Other fraud prevention measures include the review of
databases to ensure internal management controls, adoption of
verification methods by the President to identify eligible recipients of
federal aid, and the establishment of fraud prevention training
programs. 0 0 These amendments were meant to protect the federal
government, but there are no amendments that tackle the rampant
insurance fraud that is partly the fault of the federal government because
they provide the NFIP. 01
The enactment of PKEMRA was certainly a step in the right
direction because it acknowledged the significant issues with FEMA and
02
the distribution of federal aid after Hurricane Katrina.1 However, the

93. Id.
94. Id; see supra Part H.A.1.
95. See supraPart ILA.1.
96. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33729 at 42-44.
97. Id. at 43-44.
98. Id.at 43.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 43-44.
101. Id.at 42-44. For a summary of the National Flood Insurance Program, see The National
Flood Insurance Program, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program (last
visited Apr. 22, 2019).
102. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33729 at 1.
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Act failed to provide solutions for the biggest issues during Katrina
rebuilding, namely bureaucratic red tape, contractor fraud, and insurance
fraud. °3 The enactment of PKEMRA, its reorganization of FEMA, and
amendments to the Stafford Act set the stage for the recovery process for
future natural disasters, including Superstorm Sandy. °n
B. Understandingthe StaffordAct andHow ItGoverned
the Distributionof ReliefDuringSuperstorm Sandy
To understand why homeowners were faced with so many hurdles
while trying to rebuild their homes after Sandy, 105 it is necessary to
understand the statutory authority that dictates the federal government's
response to natural disasters.106 The Stafford Act is the governing
statutory authority for the federal government's response to natural
disasters. 7 This Subpart explains the language and goals of the Stafford
Act and identifies the administrative agencies that carry out those
goals. 0 8 This Subpart will also explain the sections of the Stafford Act
that this Note focuses on, specifically the sections of the Stafford Act
that provide the federal aid programs that were designed to provide
10 9
financial assistance to homeowners after a natural disaster.
The Stafford Act was enacted in 1988 with the goal to "provide an
orderly and continuing means of assistance by the federal government to
State and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to
alleviate the suffering and damage which results from such disasters.""'
The Stafford Act seeks to provide assistance after natural disasters in the
following six ways:
(1) revising and broadening the scope of existing disaster relief
programs; (2) encouraging the development of comprehensive disaster
preparedness and assistance plans, programs, capabilities, and
organizations by the States and by local governments; (3) achieving
greater coordination and responsiveness of disaster preparedness and
relief programs; (4) encouraging individuals, States, and local
governments to protect themselves by obtaining insurance coverage to
supplement or replace governmental assistance; (5) encouraging
hazard mitigation measures to reduce losses from disasters, including
103. See supra Part l.A.1.
104. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33729 at 1; see infra Part LII.
105. See infra Part II.
106. See infra notes 110-41 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 110-41 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 110-41 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 110-41 and accompanying text.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b) (2012).
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development of land use and construction regulations; and (6)
providing Federal assistance programs for both public and private'
losses sustained in disasters.lIl
Once the President declares a "major disaster,"' 1 2 the Stafford Act
governs the distribution of various types of federal aid. 113 The Stafford
Act grants FEMA the authority to distribute grants when the President
has declared a major disaster.114 FEMA is part of the Department of
Homeland Security and therefore has no independent decision-making
capabilities; it must report to the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security. 1 5 Outside of FEMA and the Department of
Homeland Security, other agencies "provide critical disaster recovery
assistance that falls outside the scope of the Stafford Act.""' 6 Two
agencies that provide critical relief in coordination with FEMA are the
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"), which
provides Community Development Block Grants ("CDBG") to aid
disaster survivors in rebuilding, and the SBA, which provides economic
and has been used to provide aid to private
assistance to businesses
17
well.'
as
homeowners
The Stafford Act covers every aspect of natural disaster
preparedness and the federal government's response to natural
disasters."' However, for purposes of this Note, the focus will be on
Title H (Major Disaster and Emergency Assistance Administration) and
Title IV (Major Disaster Assistance Programs) of the Act."19 Title III and
Title IV cover the sections of the Act that relate to federal aid programs

111. Id. § 5121(b)(1)-(6).
112. The Stafford Act defines a "major disaster" as:
[A]ny natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water,
winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide,
mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion,
in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes
damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under
this Act to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments,
and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering
caused thereby.
Id. § 5122(2).
113. Id.
114. Luckman et al., supra note 30, at 316 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5121).
115. Id. Prior to 2002, FEMA was an independent agency that reported to the President and
had more independence when coordinating federal disaster response. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at316,319;see42U.S.C.§5121(b).
118. Luckman et al., supranote 30, at 315; see 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b).
119. 42U.S.C.§§5141-5170.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss3/6

12

Pareja: Weathering the Second Storm: How Bureaucracy and Fraud Curtailed

2019]

WEATHERING THE SECOND STORM

and the limitations of those programs that are designed to1 20provide
assistance to homeowners who are victims of a natural disaster.
Title III, Section 312 (Duplication of Benefits),' 21 provides a
general prohibition of "duplication of benefits"1 22 and works to protect
the federal government from fraud and abuse by recipients of federal
aid. 123 The general prohibition states:
The President, in consultation with the head of each Federal agency
administering any program providing financial assistance to persons,
business concerns, or other entities suffering losses as a result of a
major disaster or emergency, shall assure that no such person, business
concern, or other entity will receive such assistance with respect to any
part of such loss as to which he has received financial assistance
under
124
any other program or from insurance or any other source.
This prohibition on duplication of benefits extends to other agencies that
are not within the scope of the Stafford Act, such as the Community
Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Program ("CDBG-DR"),
thereby preventing duplication of financial assistance from other sources
ordinarily outside the scope of the Act. 25 Section 312(c) also authorizes
the federal government to recover any duplicative benefits and hold
liable any individual that has received more than one type of relief for
the same loss in violation of Section 312(a). 126 Further, Section 314 lists
penalties for misuse of funds distributed under the Act, including civil
127
and criminal penalties as well as referral to the Attorney General.
Title IV, Section 408(a) (Federal Assistance to Individuals and
Households), allows the President to provide financial assistance-in
some cases direct services-to individuals and households that cannot
120. Id.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 5155.
122. A duplication of benefits is found when:
[A] beneficiary receives assistance from multiple sources for a cumulative amount that
exceeds the total need for a particular recovery purpose. The amount of the duplication is
the amount of assistance provided in excess of need. The Stafford Act requires a factspecific inquiry into assistance received by each person, household, or entity. A grantee
may not make a blanket determination that a duplication of benefits does not exist for all
beneficiaries or recipients under a disaster recovery program. As a result, all disaster
recovery funds must be governed by policies and procedures to prevent duplication of
benefits. In disaster recovery, it is common for multiple sources of funds to be used to
address a single need. Any recipient receiving a duplicate benefit may be liable to the
Federal government.
Luckman et al., supra note 30, at 318 (quotations omitted).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 5155.
124. Id.
125. Luckman et al., supra note 30, at 317-19.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 5155(c).
127. Id.§ 5157(a)-(d).
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afford the expenses and needs sustained as a direct result of a major
disaster. 128 Section 408(b) allows the President to provide financial
assistance for disaster-related housing assistance to "individuals or
households who are displaced from their primary residences or whose
pre-disaster primary residences are rendered uninhabitable."' 129 The
various types of housing and financial assistance are listed and explained
in detail, and include options for temporary and permanent housing.130
Section 408(h) (Maximum Amount of Assistance) creates a limit on the
amount of financial assistance that individuals or households can
receive, providing that "[n]o individual or household shall receive
financial assistance greater than $25,000 under this section with respect
to a single major disaster."13 ' Section 408(i) (Verification Measures)
also addresses the concern of possible duplication of benefits by
requiring the President to develop a system that can monitor individuals
and households receiving assistance under Section 408.132
In an effort to help the Sandy recovery process run more efficiently
and provide more streamlined relief, President Barack Obama signed
into law the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 ("SRIA")1 33 and
the accompanying Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013.134 The
enactment of SRIA provided significant changes to several aspects of
Sandy relief efforts that affect individuals and homeowners, including

128. Id.§ 5174(a)(1). Section 408(e) (Financial Assistance to Address Other Needs) provides
that the President may provide financial assistance (outside of housing needs), including: medical,
dental, child care, personal property, transportation, and other expenses to an individual or
household in the state who is adversely affected by a major disaster. Id.at (e)(l)-(2).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 5174(b)(1).
130. Id. § 5174(c)(l)-(4).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 5174(h).
132. The system should be used by the President or a designee of the President to:
(1) verify the identity and address of recipients of assistance under this section to provide
reasonable assurance that payments are made only to an individual or household that is
eligible for such assistance; (2) minimize the risk of making duplicative payments or
payments for fraudulent claims under this section; (3) collect any duplicate payment on a
claim under this section, or reduce the amount of subsequent payments to offset the
amount of any such duplicate payment; (4) provide instructions to recipients of
assistance under this section regarding the proper use of any such assistance, regardless
of how such assistance is distributed, and (5) conduct an expedited and simplified review
and appeal process for an individual or household whose application for assistance under
this section is denied.
Id.§ 5174(i).
133. Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-1, § 1101, 127 Stat. 39,
https://www.congress.gov/1 13/plaws/publ2/PLAW-1 l3publ2.pdf.
134. Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-2, § 1101, 127 Stat. 4,
https://www.congress.gov/1 13/plaws/publ2/PLAW- 1 13pub l 2.pd f ; Sandy Recovery Improvement Act
of2013, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/sandy-recovery-improvement-act-2013 (last visited Apr. 22,
2019).
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the de-obligation of unexpended Sandy grants, 3 5 disaster relief fund'
reporting,' 3 6 individual assistance declaration factors,' 3 7 and the federal
unified review process,'3 8 to name a few. 139 While these legislative
changes provided some positive amendments to some sections of the
Stafford Act that affect homeowners' access to relief funds, 4 ° they do
not address the most pressing issues homeowners have faced which
prevented and continue to prevent them from rebuilding. 141
C. An Overview of FederalNaturalDisaster
ReliefProgramsAvailable to Sandy Survivors
In the wake of Superstorm Sandy, FEMA and other agencies,
including HUD and the SBA, provided qualifying homeowners the
opportunity to receive federal aid to rebuild. 142 This Note focuses on
these agencies specifically because they were two main sources of
federal aid for Superstorm Sandy relief.143 It is necessary to explain how
these agencies and the relief programs they provide operate to
understand the options homeowners were given by the federal
135. Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, supra note 134. The de-obligation of Sandy
grants through the Office of Management and Budget allowed FEMA to waive the requirement of
grantee/sub-grantee expenditure of obligated grant funds within twenty-four months or funds would
be returned to the agency. Id.
136. Id. Under the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013, FEMA is required to provide
monthly reports regarding disaster relief fund spending to Congress and publish the reports on the
intemet. Id. For more information on the disaster relief fund, see Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly
Report, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/media-libmry/assets/documents/31789?id=7247 (last visited
Apr. 22, 2019).
137. Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of2013, supra note 134. The SRIA requires FEMA "to
provide more objective criteria for evaluating the need for assistance to individuals, to clarify the
threshold for eligibility, and to speed a declaration of a major disaster or emergency under the
Stafford Act." Id.
138. Id.
SRIA added Section 429 to the Stafford Act which directed the President to establish an
expedited and unified environmental and historic preservation (EHP) process by July 29,
2014 for disaster recovery actions. The Unified Federal Environmental and Historic
Preservation Review (UFR) was designed to enhance the ability of the Federal EHP
review process to inform and expedite disaster recovery decisions for grant applicants
and other potential beneficiaries of disaster assistance by improving coordination and
consistency across Federal agencies, and assisting agencies in better leveraging their
resources and tools.
Id.
139. Id. According to FEMA, "the passage of SRIA represents the most significant legislative
change to the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) substantive authorities since the
enactment of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act." Id.
140. Id.
141. See infra Part l.
142. Luckman et al., supra note 30, at 316.
143. See infra Part l.C.1-3.
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government and the limitations of the programs. 1" Subpart 1 explains
45 Subpart
the federal programs provided by FEMA, including the IHP.1
146
Subpart 3
2 provides a brief overview of HUD and the CDBG-DR.
147
loans.
SBA
and
SBA
the
of
overview
brief
a
provides
1. FEMA and the Individuals and Households Program
The Stafford Act provides emergency fmancial and physical
assistance through FEMA.148 The Act grants FEMA the responsibility to
coordinate government relief efforts after a major disaster. 149 FEMA was
meant to "bring an orderly and systemic means of federal natural
disaster assistance for state and local governments in carrying out their
responsibilities to aid citizens." 5 ' In conjunction with FEMA's role as
the coordinator for federal relief efforts, the agency operates federal aid
programs designed to provide disaster-affected states and individuals
with federal recovery funds.15 1
FEMA's IHP played an important role in the Sandy recovery
process by "provid[ing] financial and direct services to eligible
individuals and households affected by a disaster who have uninsured or
underinsured necessary expenses and serious needs."' 52 The HIP cannot
be used as a substitute for insurance; it is only meant to provide
survivors with basic needs by supplementing disaster recovery efforts
for individuals.' 53 For Sandy survivors to be eligible for assistance
through IHP, they must apply for assistance and meet general
conditions." 5 Once an applicant is found to be eligible for IHP
assistance, FEMA decides what types of housing assistance to provide
144. See infra Part II.C.1-3.
145. See infra Part H.C.1.
146. See infra Part H.C.2.
147. See infra Part ll.C.3.
148. About the Agency,FEMA, www.fema.gov/about-agency (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
149. Id. FEMA provided over one billion dollars in federal recovery aid to New Yorkers
through the Individuals and Households Program. See supra Part 1 see also New York Three Years
After Sandy, supra note 19 (providing information regarding the amounts of aid dollars distributed
from various programs).
150. About the Agency,supra note 148.
151. Id.
152. Fact Sheet, Individuals and Households Program, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/medialibrary-data/1528984381358-6f256cab09bfcbe67475 lOc2l5445560/lndividualsHouseholds
Programs.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
153. Id.
154. Id. LHP eligibility requires the following general conditions:
[T]he applicant must be a U.S. citizen, non-citizen national, or qualified alien. FEMA
must be able to verify the applicant's identity. The applicant's insurance, or other forms
of disaster assistance received, cannot meet their disaster-caused needs. The applicant's
necessary expenses and serious needs are a directly [sic] result of a declared disaster.
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for the individual or household and may include more than one type of
assistance.' 55 Applicants can appeal the determination of eligibility or
the form of assistance provided by IHP within sixty days of the date on
56
FEMA's award or denial letter.
IHP provides two main types of assistance: financial housing
assistance157 and direct housing assistance. 5 8 The IP can also provide
financial assistance for other disaster-caused expenses under the IHP
"Other Needs Assistance" provision, but some types of other needs
assistance depend on the individual's or household's ability to qualify
for an SBA disaster loan.'59 If an individual or household qualifies for an
SBA loan, they may not receive personal property assistance,
transportation assistance, moving assistance, or storage assistance. 160
The HIP imposes limitations on recovery assistance and includes
requirements for those participating in the program. 16 1 IHP's goal of
recovery assistance is limited to providing supplementary recovery funds
and is not meant to restore a home to its pre-disaster condition. 6 z Any
individual or household that receives any home repair assistance through
HIP and is located in, a "special flood hazard area" must obtain and
maintain flood insurance. 163 One of the most problematic requirements is
that survivors who received recovery assistance may be required to pay
back any misused funds. 1" It is reasonable that the government should
require the money to be spent lawfully; however, survivors are being
155. Id. FEMA makes the determination of which types of housing assistance is necessary
"based on disaster-caused loss, access to life-sustaining services, cost-effectiveness, and other
factors." Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. Financial Housing Assistance "provides funds paid directly to individuals and
households" for rental assistance, lodging expense reimbursement, home repair assistance, and
home replacement assistance. Id.
158. Id. Direct Housing Assistance may be provided in circumstances where there is a lack of
available housing resources for survivors who needed rental assistance and includes manufactured
housing units, multi-family lease and repair, and permanent or semi-permanent housing
construction. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. Other needs assistance that is unaffected by an individual's or household's ability to
qualify for an SBA loan includes funeral assistance, medical and dental assistance, child care
assistance, and miscellaneous or other items assistance. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. "lHP is not intended to replace private recovery efforts but to complement those
efforts when needed." Id. "If a homeowner wishes to return their home to its pre-disaster condition,
they may apply for a home disaster loan with the SBA." Id.
163. Id. A Special Flood Hazard Area is defined as "the area where the National Flood
Insurance Program's floodplain management regulations must be enforced and the area where the
mandatory purchase of flood insurance applies." Special Flood Hazard Area, FEMA,
www.fema.gov/special-flood-hazard-area (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
164. FactSheet, Individuals and Households Program,supra note 152.
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asked to pay back money dispersed incorrectly by FEMA.165 This is
problematic because by the time FEMA made requests for the aid money
to be returned, many individuals had already spent the money and are
now facing debt collections of sums up to $31,900."6
2. HUD and the Community Development Block
Grant Disaster Recovery Program
The goal of HUD is to "provide[] flexible grants to help cities,
counties, and States recover from Presidentially declared disasters,
especially in low-income areas, subject to availability of supplemental
appropriations. 67 In response to natural disasters, Congress can
appropriate additional funding to HUD to provide financial assistance to
communities through the CDBG-DR. 168 These grants are not available to
individuals directly; instead, they are awarded to state and local
governments, which become grantees, that the federal government has
169
determined require extra financial assistance to rebuild. The funding
CDBG-DR provides supplements other federal recovery programs
including FEMA and the SBA, but cannot duplicate already
available funding.17
The State of New York was made a grantee and received
$4,416,882,000 in relief funds, along with the City of New York which

165. Luckman et al., supra note 30, at 322; Miles Parks, For Some Superstorm Sandy Victims,
the Government Wants Its Money Back, NPR (Apr. 13, 2015, 3:29 AM), http://www.npr.org/
2015/04/13/390442517/for-some-superstorm-sandy-victims-the-govement-wants-its-money-back.
166. Luckman et al., supra note 30, at 323 (citing Emily C. Dooley, FEMA Demanding Llers
Give Back Sandy Payments, NEWSDAY (June 13, 2015, 10:46 PM), http://www.newsday.com/long"As of August 4, 2015,
island/fema-demanding-liers-give-back-sandy-payments-l.10538170).
FEMA is attempting to collect $14 million... from Sandy applicants, who it has been determined
by FEMA, were improperly paid." Id.(citing Emily C. Dooley, Schumer Asks FEMA to Stop Using
2015, 10:53 PM),
Treasury Department for Debt Collection, NEWSDAY (Oct. 21,
http://www.newsday.com/long-island/schumer-asks-fema-to-stop-using-treasury-department-fordebt-collection- 1.10992893).
167. Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Program, HUD EXCHANGE,
https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/cdbg-dr (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
168. Id. The CDBG-DR can be used to provide federal aid money to "the most impacted and
distressed areas" for disaster relief, long term-recovery, restoration of infrastructure, housing, and
economic revitalization. Community Development Block GrantDisasterRecovery (CDBG-DR)Fact
Sheet, HUD EXCHANGE, https://www.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/CDBG-DR-FactSheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
169. Community Development Block Grant DisasterRecovery (CDBG-DR) Fact Sheet, supra
note 168. After a state or local government becomes a grantee, the grant money is received by "state
agencies, non-profit organizations, economic development agencies, citizens and businesses." Id
170. Id. Once grantees are awarded CDBG-DR funds they must complete several steps before
they can utilize them including the "creation of a disaster recovery web page, Action Plan approval,
applicable environmental reviews and the execution of a grant agreement with HUD." Id.
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received $4,213,876,000.17' Through those funds, HUD and the CDBGDR sponsored the Build It Back program which provides funding to
homeowners in New York to raise their homes to protect from future
flood damages.17 2 This program provided homeowners an opportunity to
receive federal funds to reconstruct the foundation of their homes under
the condition that the house would be raised to prevent future flood
damages.173 As of August 2018, the Build It Back program is nearly
complete and has helped 8300 homeowners and landlords, housing a
total of 12,500 families in New York City.174 This included rebuilding
and elevating approximately 1375 homes in waterfront communities to
175
meet the stringent regulations for flood compliance after Sandy.
3. The Small Business Association
After the President declares a natural disaster, the SBA has the
authority through its Office of Disaster Assistance ("ODA") to provide
financial assistance to businesses, homeowners, and renters in the form
of low-interest, long-term loans.176 SBA loans were one of the primary
types of "aid" provided to small business and homeowners seeking to
rebuild. 177 Unlike grants from FEMA and other programs such as
CDBG-DR, SBA loans are required to be paid back with interest.178
To qualify for an SBA disaster loan as a homeowner, the applicant
must be deemed eligible, pass a credit check, and demonstrate an ability
to repay the loan.179 The damage amount is determined by on-site
inspections, which are conducted by loss verifiers assigned to the
Damage Verification Center ("DVC").' 1 ° After a loss verifier makes a
171.

Disaster

Grants

and

Grantee

Contact

Information,

HUD

EXCHANGE,

https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/cdbg-dr/cdbg-dr-grantee-contact-information/#hurricanesandy-and-other-disasters-pl-1 13-2including-rebuild-by-design-rbd (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
172. Welcome to NYC Housing Recovery, CITY OF N.Y., https://wwwl.nyc.gov/site/
housingrecovery/index.page (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
173. Id.
174. Id. "[T]he Build It Back program has served 99.8% of approximately 8,300 homeowners
(totaling 12,500 households) through either a reimbursement check, construction start, or
acquisition." Id.
175. Id. "Another 6,600 homeowners with moderate Sandy damage are being assisted with
repair and reimbursement - helping neighborhoods that were not in the floodplain when Sandy hit
and homeowners who did not have flood insurance." Id.
176. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES SOP 50 30 8, at 1 (Subject:
Disaster Assistance Program) (July 1, 2015). "Section 7(b)(1) of the Small Business Act, as
amended, authorizes the Agency's Physical Disaster Loan Program. SBA can make loans to repair,
rehabilitate or replace property, real or personal, damaged or destroyed by or as a result of natural or
other disasters as defined by the Small Business Act." Id.
177. Luckman et al., supra note 30, at 318-20.
178. Id. at319.
179. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 176, at 29-31.
180. Id.at 88. For a complete list of the responsibilities of the loss verifiers, see id. at 88-89.
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damage estimate, a loan officer will make all eligibility
determinations.18 1 Loan officers are responsible for analyzing verified
losses, determining eligibility of damaged property, applying all
restrictions and limitations, and preventing duplication of benefits to
determine the adjusted verified total loss. 182 To determine the final
eligible loan amount, the loan officers must make all required
deductions, resulting in the uncompensated physical loss. 83 The loan
amounts have statutory and regulatory maximums which limit real estate
damage loans to $200,000, personal property damage to $40,000,
refinancing to $200,000, mitigation measures to twenty percent of the
verified loss for physical damage (both real estate and personal property
damage), up to a maximum of $200,000.184 As of November 2013, the
SBA funded 17,092 loans for homeowners, totaling $561,069,277.185
D. An Overview of FEMA and the NationalFloodInsuranceProgram
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, through FEMA,
oversees the NFIP. 18 6 The NFJP was created in response to the National
Flood Insurance Act of 1968 ("NFIA") 18 7 and continues to be the main
source of flood insurance for the entire country. 188 The goals of the NFIP
include providing flood insurance, improving floodplain management,
and developing maps of flood hazard zones.1 89 The NFIP does not
provide insurance -directly from the federal government; instead, statelicensed insurance companies sell flood insurance to customers. 19° These
insurance companies are held accountable by state regulators who
monitor their standards and levels of service. 19 1 The NFE also sponsors
the Write Your Own program, which allows private insurance

181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

88-89.
89.
89-96.
118.

185.

SMALL Bus. ADMIN., EARLY-DEFAULTED HURRICANE SANDY DISASTER LOANS 1 (Aug.

15, 2016).
186.

FEMA, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM CLAIMS HANDBOOK 3 (Oct. 2017).

187. The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572 (1968).
188. National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), NAT'L ASs'N INS. COMM'RS,
http://www.naic.org/cipr topics/topic nfip.htm (last updated Sept. 25, 2018). Private flood
insurance does exist; however, the market for private flood insurance remains small and the NFIP
remains the main source of flood insurance for Americans. Id.
189. Id. "The National Flood Insurance Program aims to reduce the impact of flooding on
private and public structures. It does so by providing affordable insurance to property owners,
renters and businesses and by encouraging communities to adopt and enforce floodplain
management regulations." The NationalFloodInsurance Program,supra note 101.
190.

FEMA, ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NFIP 1, 3 (Mar. 2011).

191.

Id. at 3.
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companies to write and service the Standard Flood Insurance Policy in
192
their own name.
Homeowners can receive a flood insurance policy through NFIP
providing coverage up to $250,000 and its contents for up to
$100,000.193 NFIP provides two types of coverage: building property
coverage and personal property coverage, also known as content
coverage.' 94 Building property includes the building and its foundation,
electrical and plumbing systems, air conditioning systems, most
appliances, permanent carpeting, permanently installed paneling,
wallboard, bookcases, cabinets, detached garages, detached buildings,
and debris removal. 195 Personal property includes clothing, furniture,
electronics, curtains, portable appliances, nonpermanent carpets,
freezers, washers and dryers, and some valuable items including artwork
96
and furs. 1
III. LEGAL ISSUES
In the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy, homeowners faced many
obstacles to rebuild due to the current language and implementation of
the Stafford Act and rampant fraud committed by the NFIP under the
supervision of FEMA. 197 Subpart A discusses the unfairness of the
duplicative relief provisions of Section 312 of the Stafford Act, which
prevent homeowners who were pressured to accept SBA loans from
receiving any further grant money. 198 Subpart B sheds light on the most
pervasive issue affecting homeowners: the rampant fraud committed by
the insurance companies under the NFIP. 199 This Subpart also addresses
the Flood Insurance Transparency and Accountability Act of 2015

192. What is the Write Your Own Program?, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/what-write-yourown-program (last visited Apr. 22, 2019). The NFIP offers three Standard Flood Insurance Policy
forms: the Dwelling Policy form, the General Property Policy form, and the Residential
Condominium Building Association Policy form. StandardFlood Insurance Policy Forms, FEMA,
https://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program/standard-flood-insurance-policy-forms
(last visited Apr. 22, 2019).
193. Flood Insurance: How it Works, FEMA (Mar. 2015), https://www.fema.gov/medialibrary-data/142781128849236fb55e74d14c318db2996580527d 3 1/FloodInsuranceHow It
Works.pdf. "Renters can cover their belongings for up to $100,000. Non-residential property
owners can insure a building and its contents for up to $500,000 each. The average premium for a
yearly flood insurance policy is about $700 per year." Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197.
198.

See infra Part III.A-B.
See infra PartIII.A.

199.

See infra Part IlI.B.
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201
("FITA") 2 ° and efforts by FEMA to address and resolve fraud claims.
Finally, Subpart C explains the lack of accountability of FEMA and the
NFIP, as well as other concerns related to an agency accused of
committing fraud on a massive scale.20 2

A. CurrentImplementation of the Stafford Act
Causes Harm to Homeowners
Due to Section 312 of the Stafford Act, individuals and
20 3
homeowners cannot receive duplicative relief. While this rule makes
perfect sense in theory, in practice it was applied too broadly and
prevented many people from receiving any federal grant money to
rebuild.20 4 One of the main sources of relief distributed through FEMA
were SBA loans, which many homeowners were pressured to take,
20 5
FEMA and SBA loan
believing it was their best option to rebuild.
administrators failed to properly explain to many homeowners applying
for loans what the consequences of accepting an SBA loan fully
entails.20 6 Many participants of the SBA loan program "say they didn't
fully understand the potential repercussions of their loans. Now they
regret taking them, saying they ruined their chances for recovery grants
and left them with monthly loan payments their neighbors don't
have. 20 7 Since the SBA loans did not cover the costs of rebuilding,
many homeowners would have benefited from some federal grant
money as well. 20 8 However, despite repayment requirements, SBA loans
were considered grant money, preventing anyone who received an SBA
2°
loan from getting any other federal grant money.
The amount of money homeowners received from the SBA was
based on engineering reports, and in many cases, the loan amounts were

200. Flood Insurance Transparency and Accountability Act of 2015, S. 2324, 114th Cong.
(2015).
201.
202.

See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part IJl.C.

203.

See supra Part fl.B.1.

Luckman et al., supra note 30, at 320.
205. Id.; see Buyer's Remorse: Sandy Victims Regret Taking Loans Now Affecting Their
Eligibilityfor Grants, Fox NEWS (Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/12/14/buyer204.

remorse-sandy-victims-regret-taking-loans-now-affecting-their-eligibility.htm

[hereinafter Buyer's

Remorse].
206. Buyer's Remorse, supra note 205. Denise Erickson, a Superstorm Sandy victim from New

York who accepted an SBA loan and then was denied any other grant money, reported that "there
was never the understanding that we would be pushed out of the (grant) program[]." Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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only a fraction of the total cost of repairs needed.21 ° If an SBA loan and
other forms of aid did not cover the total cost of repairs for a particular
eligible purpose, then any further aid should not be considered
duplicative. 211 To clarify the duplication of benefits requirements, the
Stafford Act provides:
Once the grantee has determined the potential award and the total
assistance received or to be received, it can exclude for duplication of
benefit purposes, assistance that was: (1) Provided for a different
purpose; (2) Used for a different, eligible purpose; (3) Not available to
the applicant; (4) A private loan not guaranteed by SBA; or (5) any
212
other asset or line of credit available to the applicant.
Despite the clear language of the clarification, any person who received
an SBA loan was rendered ineligible for any further forms of assistance,
213
including grant money from the federal government.
Federal officials argue that SBA loans should be considered part of
the duplication of benefits analysis because they believe that disaster
victims' financial ability to qualify for loans and pay them back allows
for the availability of more money for those who are less likely to afford
or qualify for a loan.214 Further, not everyone can qualify for federal
grant money.215 These are valid arguments, but they are undermined by
the fact that many homeowners were pressured into accepting SBA loans
they could not afford to repay. 216 Federal officials have also failed to
take into consideration the implications of the fraud and ineffectiveness
of the SBA organization which resulted in unfair loan amounts that do
not adequately cover the cost of repairs, leaving those homeowners with
no access to any other types of relief to make up the difference. 217
Another major source of concern for Sandy survivors is the
requirement imposed by the Stafford Act that any duplicative funds
which were incorrectly awarded must be repaid to the federal

210. Luckman et al., supra note 30, at 319-20. Undervaluation and incorrect loan amounts
were a result of "systemic fraud and undervaluation, which resulted in incorrect disaster awards
from Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), as well as Small Business Administration
(SBA) loans." Id. at 315.
211. Luckman et al., supra note 30, at 319-20.
212. Id. at 318-19 (citing Clarification of Duplication of Benefits Requirements Under the
Stafford Act for Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Disaster Recovery Grantees, 76
Fed. Reg. 71,060, 71,062 (Nov. 16, 2011)).
213. Id. at319-20.
214. Buyer's Remorse, supra note 205.
215. Id.
216. Id. SBA spokeswoman Carol Chastang said that loan applicants were made aware that
accepting the loan would affect their ability to qualify for other relief. Id.
217. See id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 47:925

government.2 18 This requirement spans all federal aid programs
including SBA loans and FEMA's IHP grants. 2 19 While this requirement
seems reasonable on its face, it is overly burdensome and in some cases
impossible.2 2 ° Many Sandy survivors were in the process of fighting
unfair and inaccurate engineering reports, award amounts, and insurance
payouts for years after Sandy, which means that once all of their claims
22 1
are resolved, they may end up owing money to the government. The
IHP program sponsored by FEMA conducted an internal audit and "[a]s
of August 4, 2015, FEMA is attempting to collect $14 million from
Sandy applicants, who it has been determined by FEMA, were
improperly paid. '222 To make matters worse, in most cases the money
had already been spent and now it is up to the affected homeowners to
2 23
come up with potentially tens of thousands of dollars.
B. Rampant FraudCommitted by
Insurance Companies and Unfair Policies
When the President declares a natural disaster, there is a delivery
sequence for types of relief.224 The first in the sequence is volunteer
agencies' emergency assistance programs and insurance, including flood
insurance. 225 It is imperative that flood insurance claims are paid quickly
and effectively because they are the first and, in many cases, the only
226
type of relief for victims of a natural disaster. The most significant
issue that homeowners continue to face now, over six years later, is that
they were unaware that their insurer was using engineers to make
fraudulent reports of damages to their homes and are now attempting to
sue to recover damages.2 27 It was not until 2015 that FEMA shed light
on these issues and acknowledged the amount of fraud homeowners
faced at the hands of their insurance companies.228
218. 42 U.S.C. § 5155(c) (2012).
219. Id.; Luckman et al., supra note 30, at 318-24.
220. See Luckman et al., supra note 30, at 322-27.
221. Id. at315-16.
222. Id. at 323.
223. Id. "Individuals may find themselves having to pay sums as large as $31,900 dollars back
see also FEMA Demanding Llers Give
to the agency tasked to help them in a time of need." Id.;
Back Sandy Payments, supra note 166 (reporting that "FEMA's individual housing program can
grant disaster survivors as much as $31,900 to help with rental assistance, to replace damaged
property, contents of a home, and other costs").
224. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., supra note 176, at 90.
225. Id.Examples of volunteer agencies emergency assistance programs include ARC and the
Salvation Army.Id.
226. Id.; Luckman et al., supra note 30, at 318.
227. FEMA: Evidence of Fraudin HurricaneSandy Reports, supra note 31.
228. Id.
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Homeowners who maintained a flood insurance policy at the time
of Superstorm Sandy were mainly insured through the NFIP. 229 The
NFIP required all policyholders to support their flood insurance claims
by submitting a completed and signed proof of loss with all supporting
documentation to their insurer within sixty days of the loss. 23 ° After the
proof of loss has been submitted, the insurance company would begin to
review the claim and an engineer would be sent to assess the damages
and create a report regarding the assessment.23 1 Once the engineers
completed their reports, they were sent to the insurance companies. 232 It
was at that point in the process that the fraud began.23 3
On March 1, 2015, 60 Minutes featured a story that shed light on
the systemic fraud and abuse by insurance companies after Sandy. 234 The
story featured interviews with: two families from New York who
experienced the fraudulent process first hand; Andrew Braum, an
engineer who blew the whistle on the fraud; Brad Kieserman, the head
of FEMA's flood program at the time; and Steve Mostyn, an attorney
who specializes in insurance litigation. 235 According to Mostyn, "the
fraud is taking engineers' reports and changing them from saying there
was structural damage to saying there's no structural damage, or giving
engineers a form to fill out that already has the conclusion of no
structural damage., 236 In support of Mostyn's statements, Andrew
Braum, an engineer who worked for HiRise Engineering and inspected
more than 180 homes after Sandy, stated that changes were made to his
engineering reports repeatedly and he was asked to cover it up. 237 Braum
has maintained the original reports as proof.238 One example provided by
229.

See supra Part II.D.

230.

NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM CLAIMS HANDBOOK, supra note 186, at 6. In

the case of severe floods, FEMA may authorize proof of loss extensions. Id at 7.
231. Id.at 5-6; Sharyn Alfonsi, The Storm After the Storm, CBS NEWS (Mar. 1, 2015),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hurricane-sandy-60-minutes-fraud-investigation.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. The Kaible family featured in the story reported that the city condemned the house
because it had been knocked off its foundation, but after the engineer came, they received a report
from the insurance company stating there was no structural damage. Id. The Kaible family
requested another assessment and their insurer, Wright Flood, sent the same engineer from U.S.
Forensic, George Hememar, who informed the Kaibles that Wright had doctored his original report.
Id.The Kaibles took a picture of the original report and filed a lawsuit against their insurer. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. Braum discovered changes made to one of his reports which prompted him to check all
of his original reports and compared them to the final copies the homeowners received. Id He
discovered that at least 175 of the reports (approximately ninety-six percent based on his
calculations) were doctored and the ones that were not were reports in which he recommended no
repairs be made. Id.Further, Braum stated that HiRise pressured him to sign an affidavit that he
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Braum was in a report that he wrote concluding that floodwater caused
the damage to the foundation, and the final report from the insurance
company was completely altered to say that "[s]ettlement due to
23 9 Brad
consolidation of soil caused the foundation wall to crack.,
Kieserman was appointed the head of FEMA's NFIP in March of 2015
when he admitted on national television that in his first three weeks as
the head of the NFIP, he saw evidence of rampant fraud, specifically the
fraudulent reports and potential criminal activity in the form of using
unlicensed engineers. 240 According to a report dated August 19, 2013,
FEMA was aware that there was proof that the engineer who inspected a
home, working for the firm U.S. Forensic, was not licensed to work in
New York. 24 1 Kieserman admitted that the information provided in the
document to FEMA should have been elevated within the agency
immediately, but was not. 242 According to Kieserman, he would be
meeting with Mostyn to begin negotiations to settle 2000 Sandy claims
and do everything he could to make the situation right.24 3
In response to discovering the tremendous extent of the fraud, many
homeowners sued their insurance companies in an attempt to collect the
full value of their policies. 2' The New York courts became inundated
with thousands of Sandy cases and responded by investing significant
245
resources to facilitate resolution of these cases in an efficient manner.
These cases shed light on the peer review process and other ways in
which engineering and insurance companies doctored the final
engineering reports to underpay thousands of homeowners.246
In In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, Deborah Raimey and Larry
Raisfeld sued Wright National Flood Insurance (their NFIP flood
insurer) to challenge the denial of their claims under their flood
agreed with the final, doctored reports, which he declined to do. Id.
239. Id.The insurance companies have argued in defense of their heinous actions that the final
reports were changed to allow for a peer review process which is a standard practice in the
insurance industry. Id.However, Braum stated that this practice of altering the reports without the
engineer's knowledge is not peer review. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
see, e.g., In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, 303 F.R.D. 17, 19 (E.D.N.Y 2014).
244. Id.;
245. In re HurricaneSandy Cases, 303 F.R.D. at 19. The court specifically stated in its holding
"that the instant dispute, which has exposed reprehensible gamesmanship by a professional
engineering company that unjustly frustrated efforts by two homeowners to get fair consideration of
their claims. Worse yet, evidence suggests that these unprincipled practices may be widespread." Id.
see also Raimey v. Wright Nat'l Flood Ins., 76 F. Supp. 3d 452, 455-56 (E.D.N.Y
246. Id.;
2015) (holding that "concealment of that initial report and the process that led to the new report
(including conduct at the evidentiary hearing) has prejudiced plaintiffs in terms of delay and costs in
this litigation, such that sanctions were warranted").
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insurance policy. 247 The evidence showed that U.S. Forensic and Wright
National Flood Insurance Company used the peer review process to
"unfairly thwart[] reasoned consideration of plaintiffs' claim through the
issuance of a baseless report. ' 24' The peer review process was explained
by George Hernemar, an engineer for U.S. Forensic who wrote the initial
report, and Michael Garove, a peer review engineer for U.S. Forensic,
who was assigned to review the report made by Hernemar.2 49 Hernemar
testified that he made the changes to the final report and insisted that no
one else made alterations.25 0 However, Garove testified as to how the
peer review process works 251 and explained that he made changes to the
original report based on the pictures and other information provided by
the inspecting engineer. 2 Garove claimed that everything done in the
peer review process was tracked and documented.25 3 However, "Garove
described a process by which the report authored by the inspecting
engineer was rewritten by an engineer who had not inspected the
property and whose identity remained concealed from the homeowner,
the insurer and, ultimately, the Court. 25 4 The engineer tasked with
reviewing the initial report replaced the initial report of the engineer who
actually inspected the property.2 5 The final report names Hernemar as
the "Engineer of Record" and does not mention Garove or the peer
review process at all. 6 In fact, the report states that its conclusions are
based on "physical evidence observed at the property" and "Site
Observations," and it further states that the work was "performed by
George Hernemar" with no mention of anyone else.25 7 The situation
described in this case is only the tip of the iceberg. 258 The court noted
that "[tjhis process was limited neither to this one engineer, nor
specifically to U.S. Forensic" which shows that this peer review process
247. In re HurricaneSandy Cases, 303 F.R.D. at 19.
248. Id. Both Wright and U.S. Forensic were mentioned in the 60 Minutes special on Sandy
fraud as companies that had engaged in doctoring engineering reports. See Alfonsi, supra note 231.
249. In re HurricaneSandy Cases, 303 F.R.D. at 20-22.
250. Id. at 21.
251. Garove explained that he uses a software program within Microsoft Word to add and track
markups, changes, and comments on the "initial document." Id. at 22. In his words the "peer review
process involves reviewing the contents of the report, both technically, grammatically, you know,
the entire content of the report, as well as reviewing any other drawings, photographs, or any other
information that the inspecting engineer would produce or provide to us." Id.
252. Id. at 23. It is worth noting that Garove and Hernemar explained the peer review process
differently, and it is likely that the process varies from company to company. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 23-24.
255. Id. at 23.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 19, 25.
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has potentially affected upwards
insurance claims.259

of hundreds of Sandy flood

C. The Consequences of the Lack ofAccountability
of FEMA and the NFIP
Many homeowners were defrauded by NFIP insurers and did not
learn the extent of the fraud, or that it even occurred, until they could no
longer appeal an existing claim.26 ° This situation leaves the victims of
insurance fraud with only one option to try and collect the full value of
insurer for fraud,
their policy. 261 They can bring a lawsuit against their
2 62
but this is an expensive and potentially futile option.
In response to FEMA's admission that they were aware of
fraudulent engineering reports affecting thousands of homeowners, and
the subsequent flood of litigation in response to this admission, FEMA
launched the Sandy Claims Review Process ("Review Process") in
March of 2015.263 The Review Process was originally designed to help
flood insurance policyholders who wanted to Teview their claims by
creating a unique process designed to provide a full review of their
claims.2

4

The

process

had

two

levels. 265

The

first

level

was

259. Id. at 25. The court relies on supporting documents submitted on the motion to assert that
this practice has affected hundreds, maybe thousands of Sandy victims. Id.
260. Id. at 19 (explaining that homeowners only uncovered the truth about the peer reviewed
engineer reports during the court ordered discovery process); Appealing our FloodInsuranceClaim,
Fact Sheet, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1445375610216677b966ca615
(last
fbc30ce3d88be32611d9/FactSheetFIMAAppealsRIDSC_101415 v4(2)accessible.pdf
visited Apr. 22, 2019) (explaining the appeals process for NFIP insurers, specifically that an insured
must appeal a final claim decision "within 60 days of the insurer's written final decision"); FEMA:
Evidence of Fraud in HurricaneSandy Reports, supra note 31 (providing examples of two
homeowners who were defrauded by their flood insurer and were forced to pursue lawsuits in an
attempt to collect their policies).
261. See Appealing Our Flood Insurance Claim, Fact Sheet, supra note 260. After an insured
files an appeal FEMA will respond in one of three ways. Id. If FEMA disagrees with the
policyholder, they will provide a detailed explanation of their conclusion. Id There is no additional
step with the insurer for policyholders who have also been unsuccessful on appeal. Id
262. Charles Lane, After Sandy: Insurance Claim Battles Cost Homeowners, Taxpayers, NPR
(Feb. 17, 2015, 5:06 PM), https://www.npr.org/2015/02/17/385992207/after-sandy-insurance-claimbattles-cost-homeowners-taxpayers. "In court documents, lawyers for insurance companies estimate
that legal fees could top $100 million. Federal Magistrate Gary Brown called that number a 'really,
really big problem' because that would be far more than the disputed amount." Id.
263. Douglas J. Pepe, Why FEMA's Sandy Claims Review Process Isn' Working, LAw 360
(May 25, 2016, 1:14 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/799820/why-fema-s-sandy-claimsreview-process-isn-t-working; Sandy Claims Review Division Update, FEMA (Feb. 10, 2017),
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1487182028686-164dee0b34d7fc0345561a7dcfd 10912/
Final SandyClaimsReview FactSheet_021017.pdf.
264. Pepe, supra note 263.
265. Id.
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administrative "desk review" by FEMA contractors.266 This was a
procedure which promised policyholders a "'fair, transparent and
expeditious' review of their claims by 'highly skilled NFIP certified
adjuster[s]' in a process that would take 'less than 90 days to
complete.' ' 267 If the policyholder was still dissatisfied after the first level
of review, "they could request a second review by a 'highly qualified
third party neutral' who would conduct a 'hearing involving the
policyholder, the caseworker and the neutral' and make a
recommendation to FEMA on their claim. 2 68 FEMA could choose to
ignore neutral decisions, but the agency promised to "give substantial
weight to the neutral's recommendation" on all issues.269
The Review Process that was originally planned morphed into
another unfair and drawn out process that deviated from FEMA's initial
promises. 27 0 FEMA used the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") 27 ' as
a shield to redact policyholders' files beyond what was necessary.272
This caused significant delays and compromised the materials
policyholders would need to rely on to review and analyze their own
files.273 Despite mandating that all flood claims files "must contain draft
engineering reports" that should be made "available to policyholders
upon request," in practice FEMA has only provided unaltered draft
engineering reports if they were already in its possession.2 74 The thirdparty review process promised review and recommendations by
independent arbitrators who had no affiliation with FEMA, whose
'
recommendations would be given "substantial weight."275
Instead,
FEMA changed the standard, which resulted in neutral arbitrators being

266. Id. (citations omitted).
267. Id. (citations omitted).
268. Id.(citations omitted).
269. Id.(citations omitted).
270. Id.
271. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
272. Pepe, supra note 263.
273. Id."FEMA has relied on FOIA exemptions to redact policyholder files, despite the fact
that the Privacy Act itself bars agencies from relying on FOIA exemptions 'to withhold from any
individual any record which is otherwise accessible to such individual' under thePrivacy Act." Id.
(citations omitted).
274. Id. (citations omitted); see Memorandum for WYO Principal Coordinators and National
Flood Insurance Program Servicing Agent W-15025, at 2 (June 1, 2015) (directing NFIP Claim
Handlers to provide "full transparency on the adjustment of claims, including associated
engineering services, if necessary"). The main reason policyholders were dissatisfied with the
claims process and the reasons for thousands of lawsuits was that draft engineering reports were
being doctored by engineering companies and the insurance companies, so it is absurd for FEMA to
refuse to provide the originals when reevaluating the claims through the Review Process. Pepe,
supranote 263; see infra Part ll1.B.
275. Pepe, supra note 263.
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precluded from interpreting the standard flood policy or rendering any
legal decision that FEMA disagrees with.27 6 To make matters worse,
when a neutral arbitrator makes a decision, it is sent directly to a "neutral
review committee" within FEMA, then to a FEMA official, and then a
decision is made on the file without the policyholder knowing anything
about it.27 7 The policyholder will not find out about the neutral opinion
until they receive the final decision letter from FEMA, which does not
include a copy of the neutral opinions or supporting documents.2 78
These practices are in direct contradiction of the transparency
FEMA promised.2 79
Critics of FEMA and its efforts to resolve the rampant fraud
accusations have pointed to another unsettling aspect of the Review
Process.2 8 ° August Matties, an attorney for over 1000 policyholders
fighting Sandy claims, stated that the companies hired to execute the
Review Process would make more money on its contracts with FEMA
than policyholders would receive through the program.28 1 Another
concern is that FEMA hired David Maurstad in 2016 as the Assistant
Administrator for Federal Insurance.282 Maurstad was the senior vice
president of Optimal Solutions and Technologies, one of the companies
that made millions handling the Review Process from 2011 through
2016.283 Maurstad was acting NFIP director in 2005 when he became the
subject of a lawsuit that alleged FEMA and the NFIP were engaging in
wrongful conduct and systematically underpaying claims. 284 This is
troublesome because the focus of the 2005 lawsuit mirrors the behavior
that occurred again to Sandy policyholders, the resolution of which has
been tasked with FEMA, who has David Maurstad as the assistant
administrator for federal insurance.28 5

276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. If policyholders wish to see the neutral's reports, they have to request them on their
own, which may take months, only to receive files with entire sections of the documents redacted
due to various FOIA exemptions asserting privileges that do not apply to Privacy Act files. Id.
279. Id. "No published source identifies this change. Documents produced by FEMA to the
author under FOIA, however, acknowledge the new standard." Id.
280. Todd Shepherd, Top FEMA Official Was Executive at Company Accused of Hurricane
Claims Fraud,WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 13, 2017, 2:55 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/
top-fema-official-was-executive-at-company-accused-of-hurricane-claitns-fraud/article/2634304
(alleging that a company called Optimal Solutions and Technologies ("OST"), working for FEMA,
pressured employees to lowball claims).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
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Despite the many issues raised above, as of February 10, 2017, the
Review Process has closed 14,561 claims and paid policyholders a
total of $177,629,389.286 Of the 1632 NFIP policyholders who litigated
their claims, 1630 cases were settled, awarding a total amount
of $164,320,515.287
IV. SOLUTIONS

Since there were many complex issues affecting disaster relief for
Sandy survivors, a few different types of action are necessary to provide
a better system for future disaster relief.288 Subpart A proposes
amendments to Section 312 of the Stafford Act to prohibit SBA loans
from being considered in a duplicative relief analysis, to clarify existing
language regarding duplicative relief to prevent the overbroad
application which adversely affected homeowners after Sandy, and to
protect homeowners from repayment resulting from bureaucratic
mistakes and not fraud.289 Subpart B advocates for reform of the NFIA
to change the peer review process which will help protect policyholders
from fraud and create a more effective process to challenge claims.2 9 °
This Subpart also proposes new requirements under the NFIA to ensure
that FEMA and the NFIP provide better assistance to homeowners
through all stages of disaster relief.29 1 Finally, Subpart C explains the
need to create a claims review process that is more transparent and fair
292
to homeowners for future disaster relief.
In the few short years following Sandy there have been numerous
hurricane 293 and flood related disasters 294 across the country. 295 Disasters
of this magnitude are predicted to become more frequent and devastating
in the future due to climate change. 296 The survivors of the more recent
286.

Sandy Claims Review Division Update, supra note 263.

287.

Id.

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

See supra Parts l1C, 11.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part I.C.
Willie Drye, 2017 Hurricane Season Was the Most Expensive in US. History, NAT'L

GEOGRAPiC (Nov. 30, 2017), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/11/2017-hurricaneseason-most-expensive-us-history-spd (discussing the three major hurricanes of 2017, Harvey, Irma,
and Maria); Emily Shapiro, 5 Natural Disasters That Devastated the US. in 2018, ABC NEWS

(Dec. 8, 2018, 5:47 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/natural-disasters-devastated-us-2018/story?
id=59367683 (discussing damage from Hurricanes Michael and Florence in 2018).
294. Shapiro, supra note 293 (describing the damage from the flooding in Montecito,
California, Maryland, North Carolina, and South Carolina).
295. Drye, supra note 293.
296. Id; Shapiro, supra note 293.
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which further
disasters will face the same issues as Sandy survivors,
29 7
highlights the need for reform as proposed in this Part.
A. Amending the StaffordAct
As explained earlier in Part III.A, one of the main resources
available to homeowners after Sandy was SBA loans, which were the
only form of aid that was required to be paid back with interest. 9 8 Many
homeowners believed that accepting an SBA loan was their only option
to start rebuilding their lives, and it was not until after they accepted the
loans that they learned they would not qualify for any other aid.299 This
is inherently unfair because many homeowners who accepted the loans
were being responsible and proactive, but they were made to feel like
they were being punished.3"u Further, SBA loan amounts were issued
based on damage estimates and the creditworthiness of the applicants,
which meant that the loans rarely covered all of the damages and left
homeowners with repair costs they could not afford.3"'
Title IH, Section 312 of the Stafford Act is meant to protect the
government from fraud by prohibiting recipients of federal aid from
receiving duplicative relief.30 2 Section 312(b) should be amended
as follows:

297. Scott Cohn, Now Come the Insurance Headachesfor Hurricane Victims - a Cautionary
Tale Wherever You Live, CNBC (Oct. 19, 2018, 5:02 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/19/nowcome-insurance-headaches-for-hurricane-victims-a-cautionary-tale-wherever-you-ive.html
(describing the headaches ahead for victims of Hurricane Florence based on the problems Sandy
survivors faced); Brady Dennis, The Country's Flood Insurance Program Is Sinking. Rescuing It
Won't Be Easy, WASH. POST (Jul. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health7
2
7 7 6
science/the-countrys-flood-insurane-program-is-sinking-rescuing-it-wont-be-easy/ 01 /0 /1 /dd
66c44-6291-lle7-84al-a26b75ad39fe story.htmlutm_term=.544e0e59649f (explaining that, with
the increasing prevalence of major disasters, the NFIP will not be able to keep up and major reform
as needed for the NFIP to be successful in the future); see infra Part IV. In the aftermath of these
post-Sandy storms there have been no changes to the Stafford'Act or the NFIA that address the
issues previously described in Part ll for which the solutions proposed in Part IV attempt to
resolve. See 42 U.S.C. § 5155 (2012) (there have been no amendments to § 5155 which detail the
(Oct. 2018),
NFIP Flood Insurance Manual, FEMA
of benefits);
duplication
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1538670828969-81423feb161c06426ac157a409123f3d/
1 reference 508 oct2018.pdf (listing the most recent amendments and changes to the NFIA; there
is no mention of reform of the peer review process); see supra Part I1; infra Part IV.A-C.
298. Luckman et al., supra note 30, at 320; see supra Part I.A.
299. See Buyer's Remorse, supra note 205.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See 42 U.S.C. § 5155 (2012).
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(3) EXCEPETION-An SBA loan shall not to be consideredfor
duplicative relief unless it provided complete coveragefor all losses
suffered.3 3 Therefore, if an SBA loan is provided that does not cover
all losses suffered for a particular purpose, the government may
issue other forms offederal relief if it is deemed necessary to cover
3 04

the loss.

This addition to Section 312 would allow people who received
SBA loans to qualify for other federal aid if the loans did not adequately
cover their losses. 3 5 This would still protect the government and
insurance companies from "double dipping" or duplicative relief, as the
Stafford Act initially intended, by only creating the exception when
the person was not adequately covered for a particular purpose by
the loan.3°*
Another major problem for people who received relief from the
government is the recoupment of duplicative relief that was awarded due
to mistakes made by the agency responsible for determining eligibility of
grant money.3 °7 This means that people who accepted grant money in
good faith, and who then received other aid or more insurance money
later after fighting their insurers, could end up owing the government
money. 308 Section 312(c) should address this issue by an amendment to
include the following:
(c) Recovery of Duplicative Benefits-Any duplicative relief that was
accepted in goodfaith and awardedas a result of mistake or during an
ongoing claims process which is later resolved to provide aid that was
not initially anticipatedshall not be requiredto be repaid if the funds
were properly used.30 9

This amendment would protect many people who were failed by the
ineffective and fraudulent processes responsible for providing disaster
relief and who accepted duplicative relief not resulting from fraud.31 °

303. See id.; Luckman et al., supra note 30, at 319-22 (discussing the unfairness of the
overbroad application of the prohibition on duplicative relief and recommending similar relief).
304. See 42 U.S.C. § 5155; Buyer's Remorse, supra note 205 (explaining that the SBA loan
was not enough to rebuild and that they were prevented from receiving any further federal aid).
305. See Luckman et al., supranote 30, at 319-22; Buyer's Remorse, supra note 205.
306. See 42 U.S.C. § 5155 (stating that the duplication of benefits is supposed to "assure that
no such person, business concern, or other entity will receive such assistance with respect to any
part of such loss as to which he has received financial assistance under any other program or from
insurance or any other source").
307. See 42 U.S.C. § 5155(c); Luckman et al., supra note 30, at 320.
308. See, e.g., Luckman et al., supranote 30, at 323.
309. See 42 U.S.C. § 5155(c); Luckman et al., supranote 30, at 320.
310. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5208; Luckman et al., supra note 30, at 320.
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B. Reform of the NFIA to Better
Prevent FraudandProvide Accountability
In 2015, FEMA admitted to finding a systemic use of fraudulent
engineering reports by engineering companies and insurance companies
participating in the NFIP.31 1 FEMA has been aware of the fraud for years
and failed to take action immediately to correct their mistakes, leading
many homeowners to sue their insurers in an attempt to collect the full
value of their policies. 312 In re HurricaneSandy Cases shed light on how
exactly the insurance companies and engineering companies were hiding
their fraudulent actions and justifying them with the peer review
process. 313 FEMA introduced the Claims Review Process to reevaluate
the insurance claims of thousands of policyholders to make sure they
received the correct insurance payment.3 14 Among other issues, the
Claims Review Process fails to provide the transparency originally
promised, but most importantly, it does not solve the real problem which
is the use of peer review by NFIP insurers.315
FITA sought to amend the NFIA to provide transparency and
accountability from FEIA during the flood insurance claims process in
an effort to protect homeowners during future disaster from the massive
316 The bill
amount of fraud proven to have occurred during Sandy.
provided many necessary changes to the NFIA which would protect
policyholders in the future, but did not specifically change the peer
review process which was a main source of the fraud.317 The bill was
311. See Alfonsi, supranote 231.
312. Id. (noting that Brad Kieserman, the head of FEMA's flood program in 2015, reported
that he was aware of the fraudulent reports as early as 2013).
313. See In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, 303 F.R.D. 17,19 (E.D.N.Y 2014).
314. Sandy Claims Review Division Update, supra note 263.
315. Pepe, supra note 263.
316. Flood Insurance Transparency and Accountability Act of 2015, Summary,
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2324 (last visited Apr.
22, 2019) [hereinafter FITA Summary]. See generally Flood Insurance Transparency and
Accountability Act of 2015, S. 2324, 114th Cong. (2015).
317. FITA Summary, supra note 316. This bill sought to amend the NFIA to prevent insurance
companies or engineers from changing reports without documenting who made the changes or
reporting the changes to the policyholder. Id. The bill also increased transparency by directing
FEMA to
(1) create and maintain a publically searchable online database that includes specified
information regarding claims filed under the Program, and (2) establish guidelines and
standards to require that any engineering or litigation cost billed to the Program by a
Write Your Own insurance company is justified on a case-by-case basis.
Id. Further, the bill provided that
[t]he Bunning-Bereuter-Blumenauer Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 is amended to
require FEMA to ensure that: (1) the appeals process has clear rules, forms, and
deadlines; (2) these are given to a claimant at the time a claim is first denied; and (3) the
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never enacted and FEMA has not acted on its own to rectify the issues
with the NFP 318 Reform of the NFIA is necessary to protect
policyholders who file claims with their insurance companies after a
natural disaster.3" 9 A new federal law must be passed which incorporates
FITA and also provides a detailed description of a uniform peer review
process that is fair and transparent to policyholders.32 °
The. use of peer review by engineering companies allowed an
engineer who had never personally inspected the property to completely
alter the original engineering report that was conducted by an engineer
who did inspect the property. 321 This is counterintuitive because
someone who has never personally evaluated the property should not be
responsible for correcting the work of an equally qualified engineer who
322
personally observed the property and wrote a contemporaneous report.
The new law would create a new peer review process that requires any
engineer to have personally inspected the property before they can alter
the original engineer's report.323 The new process would begin with a
properly certified engineer inspecting the property, creating a
preliminary report, and documenting her findings.3 24 A second engineer
would then review the preliminary report and supporting documents
from the initial inspecting engineer to determine whether they believe
there are errors in the first report, and they can recommend that a third
engineer inspect the property. 325 The second engineer would be the
reviewing engineer and would not be allowed to make changes to the
initial report, but instead could write their own report with their concerns
and recommendations for a third engineer to inspect the property.32 6
Next, the insurer and engineering company would send a third engineer
policyholder's legal options are explained upon denial of appeal.
Id.
318. Id. (The latest action on this bill was that it was read twice on November 19, 2015 and
then referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs); S. 2324, 114th Cong.
(2015).

319. See supra Part mfI.C.; see also In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, 303 F.R.D. 17, 19 (E.D.N.Y
2014) (discussing the effects of rampant fraud which were uncovered partly through the discovery
process during litigation).
320. See supra Part M.C; see also In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, 303 F.R.D. at 19 (discussing
the fraudulent peer review process used during Sandy recovery and the detrimental effects it had on
policyholders' efforts to collect the fair value of the insurance policies).
321. See Alfonsi, supra note 231.
322. Id.
323.

Id.; see also In re HurricaneSandy Cases, 303 F.R.D. at 19, 21-24.

324. See In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, 303 F.R.D. at 19, 21-14 (showing the current process
and how it allows for an engineer who has never inspected the property to completely change the
report of the initial engineer who did inspect the property).
325. Id.
326. Id.
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to inspect the property if they agree with the reviewing engineer's
recommendation for a second opinion by a third engineer.32 7 The third
engineer would conduct their inspection and write a new report, without
seeing the original report or the second reviewing engineer's report, so
as to avoid being influenced by either the insurance company or the
engineering company to alter the original report without cause.3 28 After
the third engineer submits her report, the initial engineer and the second
engineer will discuss their reports with each other to work out any
discrepancies between the two reports.3 29 Together they will create
which will be used by the insurer to determine the
a final report 330
amount.
payout
The transparency issue can be resolved by amending the NFIA to
make it mandatory that flood insurance companies provide all reports
and supporting documents to the policyholders, and to inform the
policyholders at each step of the process what to expect. 33 1 The current
peer review process is completely hidden from policyholders and allows
engineers with no personal knowledge of the property to alter reports
without signing them.332 The NFIA should also be amended to require
it and
every stage and report to be signed by any engineer who33altered
3
condition.
original
their
in
saved
be
to
the previous reports
Lastly, the NFIA should be amended to require the appointment of
a flood claim counselor who would explain the entire process from filing
a claim all the way through the appeals process and work directly with
policyholders. 33 4 FITA proposed an amendment to the Homeowner
Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014331 "to require the Flood
Insurance Advocate to provide a direct point of contact for policyholders
under the National Flood Insurance Program to discuss the status of their
327. Id.
328. See Alfonsi, supra note 231 (discussing ihe polices that allowed for the fraudulent
reports).
329. Id. This procedure seeks to prevent the peer review process from being used as a tool to
lowball claims by changing the reports arbitrarily as reported by the Kaible family and as
demonstrated by the testimony of engineers during Sandy litigation. Id.; see In re HurricaneSandy
Cases, 303 F.R.D. at 19, 21-24.
330. See Alfonsi, supra note 231.
331. Id.; Pepe, supra note 263 (discussing the issues with the Sandy Claims Review Process
and focusing on the need for transparency and access to reports for homeowners to be able to fairly
challenge the insurers).
332. See Alfonsi, supra note 231; see also In re HurricaneSandy Cases, 303 F.R.D. at 19, 2124.

333.

See Alfonsi, supra note 231; see also In re HurricaneSandy Cases, 303 F.R.D. at 19, 21-

24.
334. FITA Summary, supra note 316. See generally S. 2324, 114th Cong. (2015).
335. The Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, 182
Stat 1020.
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claim appeals and the basis of the initial decision to deny their
'
claims."336
The amendment to FITA should go one step further by
requiring the NFIP to provide a Flood Insurance Advocate or flood
claim counselor once a disaster has been declared, and to reach out to all
337
policyholders and help them through the process from start to finish.
This will provide greater transparency and require NFIP insurers to
remain accountable to policyholders.3 38
C. Creatinga Claims Review Process That Is TransparentandFair
As described above, the suggested amendments to the NFIA would
change the peer review process to help prevent the systemic fraud seen
in the aftermath of Sandy.33 9 However, if policyholders feel they are
being cheated and need to appeal the insurer's decision, additional
protection is needed. 3" FEMA's Claims Review Process had many
flaws which continued to complicate the process for homeowners.34 1
Creating a new claims review process will help protect homeowners
from fraud and provide better services when they -have been affected by
fraud.342 The NFtA should be amended to change the Claims Review
Process by removing administrative desk review and only allowing
recommendations to be made by a third-party neutral.343 Administrative
desk review should be removed because it asks policyholders to trust a
system that has already failed them. 3 " The third-party neutral's
recommendation would receive substantial consideration by the FEMA
official handling the file, and the decision would then be sent to the
policyholder and the policyholder's flood insurance advocate for review

336. FITA Summary, supra note 316. Section 24 of The Homeowner Flood Insurance
Affordability Act of 2014 requires: "The Administrator shall designate a Flood Insurance Advocate
to advocate for the fair treatment of policy holders under the National Flood Insurance Program and
property owners in the mapping of flood hazards, the identification of risks from flood, and the
implementation of measures to minimize the risk of flood." Pub. L. No. 113-89, 182 Stat. 1020,
1030.
337. See Alfonsi, supra note 231. Sandy survivor Mr. Kaible described the devastation he felt
upon seeing his home for the first time after the storm and then the shock of reading the engineer
report. Id.Mr. Mero also described the streets in the days after Sandy as "Armageddon." Id
338. See FITA Summary, supra note 316.
339. See supra Parts II.C, IV.B.
340. Pepe, supra note 263 (discussing the issues with the Sandy Claims Review Process and
focusing on the need for transparency and access to reports for homeowners to be able to fairly
challenge the insurers).
341. Id.;
see supra Parts IMC, IV.B.
342. Pepe, supra note 263.
343. Id.
344. Id.Administrative desk review was supposed to be conducted by FEMA contractors and
NFIP certified adjusters. Id.
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before the final determination is made.3 45 Under the current Claims
Review Process, FEMA used the FOIA to prevent policyholders from
receiving their entire claim files and overly redacted many crucial
documents in direct violation of the FOIA.3 46 To prevent this in the
future, the NFIA should be amended to require FEMA and the NFIP to
follow FOIA correctly by allowing flood insurance advocates to report
these actions directly to the Inspector General.347 FEMA would also be
required to automatically provide not just the draft engineering reports
and any markups or alterations, but the entire claims files to the
policyholder's flood insurance advocate to review with the
policyholder.34 8 These amendments to the NFIA will ensure greater
transparency throughout the review process and that the policyholder has
all of the necessary information to review and understand her claim and
subsequent appeal.349
V. CONCLUSION

The Stafford Act was created to provide streamlined and effective
relief to the victims of natural disasters through the FEMA
organization.35 Unfortunately, the response to Superstorm Sandy was
anything but streamlined and effective; instead, thousands of
homeowners in New York failed to receive adequate relief.35 The
consequences of the failures of FEMA to prevent the rampant insurance
fraud committed by the NFIP has left homeowners without the funding
and legal support needed to rebuild their homes and their lives.352
Amending the Stafford Act to clarify when SBA loans should be
considered in the duplicative relief analysis, and to protect homeowners
from repayment when duplicative payments were the result of mistakes
made by FEMA, the NFIP, and administrators of aid programs will help
homeowners rebuild. 353 Further, the most alarming aspect of Sandy
recovery, the massive insurance fraud by the FEMA-funded NFIP, can
345.

Id. FEMA originally promised to give third-party neutrals' recommendations "substantial

weight." Id. In reality, FEMA "changed its published documentation to state that FEMA will only

give weight to 'the factual recommendations made by the neutral reviewer[s]."' Id. (citations
omitted). This meant that FEMA could easily reverse decisions it did not agree with, thereby
rendering review by a third-party neutral meaningless. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.

348.

Id.

349.

Id.
See
See
See
See

350.
351.
352.
353.

supra Partl.B.
supra Part 11.
supra Part III.
supra Part IV.A.
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be resolved by implementing amendments to the NFIA to provide
necessary changes to the peer review process and provide a new claims
review process which will create protection and transparency for
policyholders during future disasters.35 4
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